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IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER: WISCONSIN'S
ANTIQUATED APPROACH TO CHILD NAME
CHANGES IN POST-DIVORCE AND PATERNITY
PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION

Victoria and Mark Jocius were divorced on August 30, 1990.1 The
court ratified a Marital Settlement Agreement, which gave sole custody
of their three children-Matthew, Jennifer, and Bryan-to Victoria, and
permitted Mark "reasonable visitation upon notice."2
In January of 1996, a court-appointed guardian ad litem for the three
minor children obtained a child abuse temporary restraining order
against Mark.' At that time, the guardian ad litem filed an order to
show cause requesting a complete denial of Mark's periods of physical
placement with the children,4 and asking that the children's surnames be
changed to their mother's maiden name of Fleming. Victoria filed a
similar motion to deny placement and grant name change.5
The trial court found that
[I]t is clear from the evidence that Mark Jocius has been, ever
since the birth of the first child, a non-parent... Mr. Jocius is a
detriment to the minor children. Mr. Jocius has done really
nothing in the best interests of the children. Mr. Jocius is not a
fit and proper parent.6
Based on that finding, the court ordered that Mark's contact with
Matthew and Jennifer be "permanently limited to the financial
responsibility to support these children," and that Mark's contact with

1. See Jocius v. Jocius, 580 N.W.2d 708,710 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
2. Id.
3. See idat 711.
4. See id The guardian ad litem requested denial of periods of physical placement with
Mark pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 767.325(4), which grants courts authority to deny periods of
physical placement "when such placement would endanger the children's physical, mental
and emotional health.*
5. See id.at 711.
6. Id. at 713.
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Bryan be "indefinitely limited" to a financial support obligation.7 The
court also ordered that the children's names be changed to Fleming.8
Mark appealed, contesting the physical placement denial and
challenging the trial court's authority to mandate the name change. The
appellate court concluded that the trial court had exceeded its discretion
in both matters.9 Furthermore, the appellate court directed the trial

court to "correct the children's names" on remand.'"
The appellate court limited its review of the name change issue to a
cursory survey of Wisconsin statutory law surrounding name change
proceedings, concluding that "a trial court cannot ignore the statutory
procedure promulgated by the legislature.""
Jocius brings into focus an issue largely ignored in recent Wisconsin
judicial and legislative decisions: whether courts should be able to grant
a mother's unilateral request to re-name her children. The importance
7. Jocius, 580 N.W.2d at 713.
8. See id. at 712.
9. See id. at 715. With respect to the custody matter, the appellate court concluded that
the trial court had erred in making the order permanent. See i. at 713. The court stated that
it was only able to review the permanency issue, and not denial of physical placement rights
generally, because Mark failed to provide the appellate court with a full transcript of the
proceedings. See id. at 715.
10. Id. at 715 n.10.
11. Id. at 715. The court's analysis consisted of one paragraph, as follows:
We will, however, address Mark's argument regarding the children's name change.
In urging us to overturn the trial court's entire order, Mark has pointed out that the
trial court changed the surnames of the children. He posits that such an order is
contrary to the civil procedure for name changes. We agree. As noted earlier, a
provision in Chapter 767, Stats., permits the trial court to restore a former surname
to a divorcing spouse. This section makes no mention of the children, and there is no
other statute found in Chapter 767 authorizing name changes for children in
divorcing families. The general name change procedure statute can be found in
Chapter 786, Stats. Section 786.36, Stats., sets out the civil procedure for a change of
name in Wisconsin, including the names of children. This procedure requires, inter
alia, a party to file a petition, with proof of publication. It also prohibits a name
change for a minor under fourteen unless both parents consent. Here, none of §
786.36's procedural steps were followed. A trial court cannot ignore the statutory
procedure promulgated by the legislature. If the statute is valid, it is the duty of the
court to apply it in accordance with its terms ... The trial court's order changing the
names of the children was in contradiction to the statute and is void... .On remand,
the trial court should correct the children's names. We also conclude that the role of
the guardian ad litem in a post-judgment revision of a physical placement case does
not extend to or include the commencement of a civil name change action on behalf
of the children.
Town of Amnicon v. Kimmes, 249 Wis. 321,324,24 N.W.2d 592,593 (1946).
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of this issue is highlighted by an appreciation of the importance of
names generally; Part II of this Comment briefly explores the personal
and social significance of names. Part III is devoted to the historical use
of surnames and name change proceedings, while Part IV examines the
history of name change law in Wisconsin specifically. Following, Part V
includes an explication and assessment of child name change law in
other states, and Part VI of this Comment argues that Wisconsin law
should be altered to reflect the best approach. Specifically, the
legislature should enact a provision authorizing courts to grant surname
changes in the context of post-divorce and paternity proceedings when
such a change would be in the best interests of the child.
II. WHAT'S IN A NAME?

First, names have deep individual psychological significance. One
commentator pointed out that "one's own name is one of the most
personal belongings of any individual."1 2 Most of us "don't know when
our name came into being or how some distant ancestor acquired it...
yet we bear it with exalted fidelity, we merge with it, we like it, we are
ridiculously proud of it as if we had thought it up ourselves in a moment
of brilliant inspiration."13
Naming children has particular importance. A child's name often
represents his or her family identity; surnames can reflect cultural,
ethnic, religious, familial or other societal and personal values. 4 While
the United Nations has declared that a child's right to a name is
fundamental,' not all courts and commentators recognize the personal
and societal significance of naming rights. In a 1990 Kentucky decision,
the court characterized a post-divorce naming dispute, in which two
children aged 12 and 14 adamantly desired their names changed from
their biological father's to the mother's birth name, as "a matter that

12.

Omi Morgenstern-Leissner, The Name of the Maiden, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 253,

262 (1997).
13.
Lynn M. Curtis, Note, Sexism and Bias in the Name of Tradition: Missouri's
Standard of Inequality Regarding Children's Surnames, 66 UMKC L. REV. 169, 173 (1997)
(citing MILAN KUNDERA, IMMORTALrrY 33-34 (1991)).
14.
See Laura Ann Foggar, Note, Parents'Selection of Children'sSurnames, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 583, 586-88 (1983). Furthermore, "[b]y choosing a new name for a child, the
parent expresses his individuality; by giving the child his own name, the parent expresses his
relation to the community." Beverly S. Seng, Note, Like Father,Like Child" The Rights of
Parentsin their Children'sSurnames, 70 VA. L. RIV. 1303,1341-42 (1984).
15.
See GERALDINE VAN BUREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF
THE CHILD 117 (1995).
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should be of little or no consequence."16

Despite such attempts to minimize the importance of naming rights,
the passion with which many individuals pursue name changes suggests
that we as a society invest in names a great deal of personal and
associational meaning. One judge characterized the importance of
naming as follows:
An old Roman maxim runs, "Sine nomine homo non est"
(without a name a person is nothing). One's name is a signboard
to the world. It is one of the most permanent of possessions; it
remains when everything else is lost; it is owned by those who
possess nothing else. A name is the only efficient means to
describe someone to contemporaries and to posterity. When one
dies it is the only part that lives on in the world.
Most of us cherish our names and find it difficult to imagine life with
a different one. Parents and children who have been through a major
life-changing event, such as a divorce, often wish to change their names
as a symbolic change of identity to reflect an altered relationship with
themselves and with the world.
III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A. Surname Usage
Regular use of surnames in Anglican culture evolved in the eleventh
century as a consequence of the Norman conquest.18 As the population
of villages began to surge with new peasants, the limited number of
Saxon given names became problematic and peasants began to establish
their own surnames.19 Surnames developed in four distinct ways: (1)

from an individual's original village or community; (2) his trade or
profession; (3) the name of the individual's father; and (4) unique
16.
Likins v. Logsdon, 793 S.W.2d 118,122 (Ky. 1990).
17.
In re Marriage of Gulsvig, 498 N.W.2d 725,730 (Iowa 1994) (Snell, J. dissenting).
18.
See Shannon J. Kennedy-Sjodin, Note, South Dakota Supreme Court Note:
Keegan v. GudahL- The Child's Surname as a New BargainingChip in the Game of Divorce,
41 S.D. L. REV. 166, 174-75 (1996) (citing William F. Lanahan, What's in a Name? Family
Surnames and Social Upheaval in Medieval England, 65 THE SOC. STUD. 218 (1974)). The
French culture of the Norman conquest in the eleventh century deeply impacted the AngloSaxon civilization of England in several ways; use of the surname was one these major
changes. See id.
19.
See id.
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physical or mental characteristics.'
However, it was not until
primogeniture ' was firmly established in the 14th century that the
custom of hereditary paternal surnames became widespread among the
propertied classes; a son taking on his father's name helped ensure
proper inheritance rights.'
A woman was defined in relation to the males with whom she was
most closely associated--first her father, and then her husband. Early
naming practices both reflected and reinforced the doctrine of
coverture, "a legal fiction which provided that, in marriage, the wife's
legal identity became subsumed by the husband's. "21
Children were similarly marked by the doctrine of coverture; the
father of the family was the only one who retained any kind of legal
status or rights.14 This is particularly exemplified by the fact that a nonmarital child was considered "filius nullius," the "child of no one," and
was not entitled to a surname except through reputation or baptism. 2
B. ChangingNames

Common law has long recognized the right to select and change
names freely;26 in fact, that freedom has been characterized as "a deeply
engrained American tradition. '"2' As early as 1878, one New York court
validated the ability to acquire a new surname "by reputation and by
general habit."' All fifty states have now supplemented that commonlaw right with statutes.29 These statutes usually contain procedural
safeguards-for example, residency, filing, and notice-that are not
20.
(1982).

See J.N. HOOK, FAMILY NAMES: How OUR SURNAMES CAME TO AMERIcA 13

21.
Primogeniture mandates "[tlhe superior or exclusive right possessed by the eldest
son, and particularly, his right to succeed to the estate of his ancestor, in right of his seniority
by birth, to the exclusion of younger sons." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 827 (6th ed. 1990).
22.
For a more complete discussion of the history of surnames see P. REANNY, THE
ORGIN OF THE ENGLISH SURNAMES (1986); C.M. MATHEWS, ENGLISH SURNAMES (1967).
23.
Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral, ChildCenteredApproach to ChildName-Change Proceedings,99 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996).

24.

See id.

25.
Cynthia Blevins Doll, HarmonizingFilialand ParentalRights in Names: Progress,
Pitfalls and ConstitutionalProblems, 35 How. L. J. 227, 228 (1992). For a more complete
discussion of the history of the legal status and naming of non-marital children, see Kelly,
supra note 23, at 34-52.
26.
See Foggar, supra note 14, at 589 n.46 for a list of cases allowing name changes.

27.

Id. at 590.

28.
29.

England v. N.Y. Publ'g Co., 8 Daly 375,381 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1878).
For a comprehensive list of name change statutes, see Kennedy-Sjodin, supra note

18, at 176 n.91.
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found in the common law3
Women have only within the past fifty years won the battle for the
common-law right not to change their names upon marriage.31 That
right is now beyond dispute. Naming marital children, however,
remains a "virtually irrebutable male prerogative."3 In fact, most
women assume that their children must share the father's surname.33 In
actuality, parents have a "common-law right to give their child any name
they wish, and the Fourteenth Amendment protects this right from

arbitrary state action."34
Generally, child name change litigation arises between separated or
divorced parents regarding the change of the child's name from the
father's name to the mother's maiden name. 35 Until recently, many
courts reinforced the paternal surname presumption, characterizing the
father's right to have his children bear his name as "fundamental,"
"time-honored," "primary," and "a natural law principle."m Some judges
exhibited "outright hostility towards the perceived feminist influence
'
behind nontraditional naming decisions."37
One judge expressed the
concern that the non-custodial father's role would be "reduced to that of

an anonymous sperm donor, finance provider, and unwelcome visitor" if
the requested name change was granted.'

30.
See id. at 177.
31.
Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name Their Children, 3 LAW
& INEQ. J. 91, 96 (1985). Footnote 29 lists cases on point in each of the 50 states.
32.
Id. at 91.
33.
"[Flew American mothers are aware that they are not legally required to give
children their father's surnames, just as few American realize that wives need not adopt their
husband's surnames." Seng, supra note 14, at 1336. Some commentators argue that this
tradition of patrilineal naming "colors [children's] attitudes towards women's inferior social
status." Morgenstern-Leissner, supra note 12, at 268; See also Seng, supra note 14, at 1344,
who characterizes patrilineal naming as "one of the last remaining symbols of women's
inferiority in American society."
34.
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Rights and Remedies of ParentsInter Se with Respect to
the Names of their Children, 40 A.L.R.5th 697,712 (1998).
35.
See MacDougall, supra note 31, at 109.
36.
Seng, supra note 14, at 1318 n.55 (citations omitted).
37.
Merle H. Weiner, "We Are Family:" Valuing Associationalism in Disputes Over
Children's Surnames, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1625, 1738 (1997). For example, one judge stated:
"Well, I imagine my award [of child support] is going to be substantially less if the father
doesn't have the right to have that child have his name.., this women's lib thing just makes
me furious and I will put it on the record." D.R.S. v. R.S.H., 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1269 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980) (Shields, J., dissenting).
38.
In re Gulsvig, 498 N.W.2d 725, 733 (Iowa 1993). Of course, it is doubtful that
anyone would characterize the majority of mothers-who have not passed their names onto
their children-as "anonymous egg donors."
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Most courts no longer acknowledge an unsupported preference for
the biological father's name. Any common-law notion that the father
has a protected interest or primary right in having minor children of the
marriage bear his surname has been abolished. 9 Many states infer the
authority to change a child's surname from the broad language of
custody statutes which allow courts latitude to deal with any matters in
"the best interests of the child.""

Courts in other states, like the

Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 4in2 Jocius,41 require that the power be
specifically conferred by statute.
IV. WISCONSIN'S LEGACY & CURRENT LAW

Wisconsin played a unique role in the struggle for recognition of a
woman's right to change her name. In 1970, when this struggle had just
begun as an offshoot of the larger feminist movement, the Wisconsin
legislature was the first to entertain a provision which would have
allowed women to retain their birth names upon issuance of the
marriage license.43 The legislation was struck down at that time, 4 but
throughout the 1970's, Wisconsin was at the forefront of the naming
debate. When a 1973 Maryland decision45 spurred petitions for name
changes in trial courts across the nation, a 1975 Wisconsin case, Kruzell
39.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579 (Cal. 1980); see also Doll,
supra note 25, at 237 n.74.
40.
Kennedy-Sjodin, supra note 18, at 166. In Keegan v. Gudahl, for example, the
South Dakota Supreme Court inferred jurisdiction based on the following language in the
custody statute: "responsibilities which the court finds unique to a particular family or in the
best interest of the child." 525 N.W.2d 695, 697 (S.D. 1994).
41.
See Jocius v. Jocius, 580 N.W.2d 708,710 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
42.
See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf, 741 P.2d 1187, 1992 (Alaska 1987); Mayor v.
Mayor, 554 A.2d 1109, 1111 (Conn. 1989); Viola v. Fundrella, 574 A.2d 1036, 1037 (NJ. Super
Ct. Ch. Div. 1990).
43.
See Wisconsin Legislative Bureau, 1969 Executive Vetoes in Wisconsin 24 (1970).
Assembly Bill 70-3.
44. Discussion surrounding the bill exemplifies attitudes at that time:
To my knowledge, this legislation is unique. Both by custom and legally, since the
time of Edward the IV, the wife has taken her husband's surname as her own...
Our property, commercial and domestic relations law is based on this premise. The
enactment of this legislation would necessitate alteration of law, legal forms,
contracts and data processing procedures. It could lead to practical difficulties in
landlord and tenant relations, service of papers, determination of claim of title and
ability of law enforcement agencies to determine the whereabouts of individuals.
Id.
45.

Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 295 A.2d 223 (Md. 1973).
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v. Podell' quickly became the pivotal case on the issue.
As a result of the appeal in Kruzel,7 the Center for a Woman's Own
Name was formed, along with the Olympia Brown League (named for
the country's first female ordained minister from Racine, Wisconsin,
who had retained her own name in 1873 when she married).' The
Center for a Woman's Own Name and the ACLU led the movement
advocating women's right to name themselves from 1973 through 1976.49
Until recently, the Wisconsin courts and legislature have been
similarly forward-thinking with respect to child naming rights. In 1974,
the Wisconsin Attorney General issued an opinion directing the birth
registration keeper that, absent a statute to the contrary, couples have
the right to give their children the father's name, the mother's name, a
hyphenated name, or an entirely different name.' Prior to the 1970's,
Wisconsin courts had also fallen prey to the paternal surname
presumption. Note the following statement by a Wisconsin Supreme
Court judge in 1968:
There are cases.., when the use of the stepfather's surname by
the child avoids not only the difficulties but embarrassment to
the child who is unable to explain to his playmates that he is a
tragic victim of divorce. Even though the social evil of divorce is
widespread, children and many adults still do not accept as
convenient or natural a different surname for a child and his
mother."
Thirteen years later, with the naming debates of the 1970's behind it,
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held (in an unpublished opinion) that it
"saw no jurisdictional problem with a family court judge entertaining a
petition or entering an order for a change of a name of a minor child of
the parents to an action for divorce.""
In 1993, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled on the
46.

Kruzell v. Podell, 226 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1975).

47.

Id.

48.
See MacDougall, supra note 31, at 94 n.5.
49.
See Morgenstern-Leissner, supra note 12, at 258.
50.
See generally 63 Op. Att'y Gen. Wis. 501 (Oct. 7, 1974). Other states having
issued similar opinions include: Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan and Vermont. See MacDougall, supra note 31, at 114 n.62.
51.
Niesen v. Niesen, 157 N.W.2d 660, 663-64 (Wis. 1968). Disguising the paternal
surname presumption as concern for the children's welfare was a common practice in early
naming disputes.
52.
In re Mendal, 314 N.W.2d 263 (1981).
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constitutionality of a statute according the custodial parent the power to
name a non-marital child*3 Marvin Steinbach and Joyce Gustafson were
married for only a brief time, and Gustafson gave birth to their child
during the separation period.54 At that time, Wisconsin law provided
that the parent with either legal or actual custody of a child conceived
during a valid marriage, but born after divorce or separation, could
choose the name to be entered on the birth certificate. 55 Gustafson
chose to give the child her surname.56 Steinbach challenged the statute,
contending that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' He argued that because the mother gives
birth, and the birth certificate must be filed within five days of birth, she
will almost always have "actual custody" of the child and therefore the
right to name it, and that the law thus created a gender preference for
the mother The court held that the statute was "gender-neutral" and
therefore constitutional! 9 In its decision, the court made a point of
recognizing that "statutes in other states mandating giving the child the
father's name, or giving the father the sole right to name the child, have
been-quite appropriately, we think-struck down. "60
Given the above history, it is somewhat surprising that Wisconsin
has not progressed toward a more equitable approach in post-divorce
name changes for children. Contrary to the unpublished 1981 court of
appeals decision cited above, family court judges in Wisconsin are
unable to authorize name changes for minor children under the age of
14, as illustrated in Jocius.6' The Jocius court simply cited section 786.36
of the Wisconsin Statutes, which "sets out the civil procedure for a
change of name in Wisconsin, including the names of children," 62 and
states that "[i]f the statute is valid, it is the duty of the court to apply it in
accordance with its terms. "63 The statute provides, in relevant part, that:
53.

See In re Steinbach, 502 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).

54.

See id. at 157.

55.

See WIS. STAT. § 69.14(1)(f) (1993).

56.

See Steinbach, 502 N.W.2d at 157. The trial court, in the judgment of divorce,

changed the child's name to Steinbach. See id. Gustafson succeeded on a motion to re-open
the judgment and vacate the language requiring the name change. See id.
57.
See id. at 160.
58.
See id.

59.

Id.

60.
I&
61.
580 N.W.2d 708 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). See supra note 11 for the relevant portion
of the decision.
62.
Id. at 715.
63.
Id. (quoting Town of Amnicon v. Kimmes, 24 N.W.2d 592,593 (Wis. 1946)).
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If the person whose name is to be changed is a minor under the
age of 14 years, the petition may be made by: both parents, if
living, or the survivor of them; the guardian or person having
legal custody of the minor if both parents are dead or if the
parental rights have been terminated by judicial proceedings; or
the mother, if the minor is a nonmarital child who is not adopted
or whose parents do not subsequently intermarry.'
Matthew, Jennifer, and Bryan Jocius, and other children like them,
fall outside the scope of the statute. They must continue to bear the
name of a father whose actions were not sufficiently heinous to merit
judicial termination of parental rights, but whose relationship with them
was non-existent at best and violent at worst.6
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has since confirmed the Jocius
decision, rejecting trial court authority to grant a surname change based
on lack of statutory authority, in paternity proceedings.6 Noah was a
non-marital child whose father initially denied paternity.67 He shared his
mother's birth name, but in the course of paternity proceedings, his
father requested a name change.r The trial court inferred authority to
grant the name change from a statute stating that "the paternity
judgment or order may contain [various provisions].., or any other
' The trial court then reasoned
matter in the best interest of the child."69
that the name should be changed because it was in Noah's best interest.7
The appellate court, as it had in Jocius, refused to recognize the trial
court's authority to make the change.7 The court again cited the
Wisconsin name change statute, 72 and construed the paternity statute
WIS. STAT. § 786.36 (1998).
65. See Jocius, 580 N.W.2d at 713.
66.
See In re Paternity of Noah J.M., 590 N.W.2d 21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
67. See id. at 770.
68.
See id.
69.
WIs. STAT. § 767.51(3) (1997).
70. See Noah J.M., 590 N.W.2d at 771. Specifically, the court based its decision to
grant the name change of Noah's father's apparent interest in his son's life because of his
request for the name change, the fact that he was current with support, and "the lack of
involvement of the fathers in today's society in their children's lives." Id. The court of
appeals commented that, although its holding was based on statutory application, the trial
court's best interest determination would not have necessarily been upheld had it been
examined; the court of appeals could "understand why Linda so strenuously challenges each
of the grounds on which the trial court based its 'best interest' conclusion." Id. at n.3.
71.
See id.
72. See supra note 64.
64.
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narrowly to discount the possibility of name change authority.'
In this case, however, the court then went beyond its narrow
construction of the statute to point out that "even if by some sort of
syntactical stretch one could extend the 'best interest' reference.., to
potentially include name change authority, that potential authority
would be trumped by the specific statutes establishing the authority to
name a child, and establishing the authority and procedure for changing
the name of a child" 74 because "when a general statute and a specific
statute are compared, the specific statute takes precedence."T
V. APPROACHES IN OTHER STATES
Often, "the law of naming and name changing is... the last area of76
family law to reflect norms that have been repudiated in other areas. ,
Children today live in relationships with families that are either static in
composition or changing and evolving; families are fluid and so is one's
identity in relation to others. Sometimes, as in Jocius,77 a "child has
become so alienated from his or her name and the person associated
with it, that a change would serve the child's best interest."' 78 Many
states have adopted statutes, or the courts have construed related postdivorce provisions sufficiently broadly to confront this difficult issue.
Approaches to resolving name change disputes essentially fall into two
a custodial parent presumption or a best interests of the
categories:
71
test.
child
A. CustodialParentPresumption
In one of the earliest cases involving a name dispute, the court held
that the right to assign a child's given name is an incident of
guardianship: "The father is the natural guardian of his child, and
entitled to its services during infancy, and within his natural right must
fall the privilege of bestowing a name upon it."8° A more modem
formulation of the custodial parent presumption was adopted by the

See In re Noah J.M., 590 N.W.2d at 774-75.
73.
Id. at 773.
74.
Id. (citing Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 532 N.W.2d 690, 696 (1995)).
75.
76.
Kelly, supranote 23, at 75.
77.
580 N.W.2d 708 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
78.
Kelly, supranote 23, at 65.
79.
See id. at 55. However, some states combine the two tests, creating a custodial
parent presumption that may be rebutted.
80.
Wolford v. Powers, 85 Ind. 294,307 (1882).
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81
New Jersey Supreme Court in Gubernatv. Deremer.

Alan Gubernat initially denied paternity of Karen Deremer's son,
Scott Deremer. After paternity was definitively determined, Gubernat
established a relationship with Scott through informal visitation
arrangements.' However, when these arrangements became the subject
of disagreement, Gubernat filed an action to have joint legal custody
declared, visitation rights, and Scott's name changed.' The trial court
granted all of the above, and the appellate court affirmed.' In its
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the history of
surnames at length,6 focusing specifically on the paternal surname
presumption and its inequity.
Based on a number of recent legislative enactments involving
custody rights, the Gubernat court declared: "[t]he Legislature clearly
has ended gender-based differences in marital and parental rights,
whether rooted in law or custom, and instead determined that parental
disputes about children should be resolved in accordance with each
child's best interests.'
However, the court expressed concern that
some trial courts would still rely on outdated tradition and custom, and
cloak an actual paternal surname presumption "by treating the child's
best interests as synonymous with the father's best interests. "" Thus, in
order to ensure that the child's best interests are considered regardless
of gender-based notions of parental rights, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recognized "[t]he presumption that the parent who exercises
physical custody... will act in the best interest of the child" in selecting
the name (allowing for circumstances in which that presumption could
be rebutted).' Gubernat's statement that he wanted Scott to know that
"he will always have a father" was not sufficient to rebut the
presumption that Deremer, the custodial parent, had acted in Scott's
best interest when naming him.9° The New Jersey Supreme Court
created a new state standard, and Scott Deremer kept his mother's
81.
657 A.2d 856 (N.J. 1995).
82.
See id. at 857.
83.
See id.
84.
See id.
85.
See id.
86. See id. at 859-66.
87.
Id. at 866.
88.
Gubernat,657 A.2d at 867. A trial court in Wisconsin appeared to engage in just
this kind of reasoning. See supranote 70.
89.
Id. at 869.
90.
Id. at 870.
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name. 91
Commentators in favor of the custodial parent presumption
characterize naming as part of child-rearing authority, which is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
The Supreme Court has characterized the role of parents in their
children's lives as a deeply rooted principle encompassed in substantive
due process, and "established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition. "3
In post-divorce proceedings, courts uniformly uphold the custodial
parent's right to make decisions regarding education and religious
training over the objections of the non-custodial parent.' Because a
name can have "psychological, educational, and religious significance,"
courts reason that a custodial parent should be in charge of the naming
decision.' Further, the parent in daily contact with the child is better
equipped to make decisions about the child's welfare.9 Supporters of
this position argue that, where the parents do not share custody, courts
should "presume that the custodial parent acts in the child's best
interests," as is assumed to justify allowing the custodial parent to make
decisions about other aspects of the child's daily lifeY
In addition, commentators point out that the custodial parent
presumption is probably the most predictable method of resolving such
disputes." Supporters of the custodial parent presumption argue that a
presumption minimizes subjectivity, as opposed to the best interests of
the child standard, which awards the court more discretion.
Theoretically, this greater degree of predictability would discourage
litigation; minimizing litigation is itself in the best interest of the child.'
91.
See id. Sadly, Alan Gubernat murdered his son, three-year-old Scott, just four
days after the supreme court's decision. See Alan M. Grosman, ParentalDisputes Over the
Surname of a Child, NJ. LAWYER, May 1997, at 26.
92.
See Foggar supra note 14, at 586-88. "[T]he choice of a child's surname is a
constitutionally protected child-rearing decision." Id. at 598.
93.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,232 (1972).
94.
See Seng, supra note 14, at 1310 n.29.
95.
MacDougall, supranote 31, at 149.
96.
See Seng, supra note 14, at 1310. " Courts should assume that custodial parents do
not engage in practices that harm their children." Curtis, supra note 13, at 191.
97.
Foggar, supra note 14, at 597 (citing In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579,
584-85 (Cal 1980)).
98.
See Kelly, supranote 23, at 69.
99.
See Foggar, supra note 14, at 598. For a more complete discussion of the
operation of the custodial parent presumption, see Note, No Judicial Dyslexia: The Custodial
Parent Presumption Distinguishes the Parental from the Paternal Right to Name a Child, 58
N.D. L. REV. 793 (1982).
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B. Best Interests of the Child Standard

The majority of states currently use some form of the best interests
of the child standard to determine whether to approve a post-divorce
child name change. ' The best interests standard is "ubiquitous in
family law."' 0' It is applied in almost every legal disposition involving
minors: custody and visitation, adoption, abuse and neglect, termination
of parental rights, and disposition following juvenile court
proceedings."
The Uniform Parentage Act utilizes a best interests standard, and
sets forth the following factors to be considered in a child name change
proceeding:
[The] potential impact on the relationship with each parent,
child's preference, length of time the current surname has been
used, misconduct, motivation of parents, identification of child
with a particular family unit; any embarrassment, discomfort, or
inconvenience resulting from different name as that of the
custodial parent, whether a different name may cause insecurity
or lack of identity. 3
While only a few states have explicitly adopted the Uniform
Parentage Act, most courts consider the above factors, or some
variation close to that list." The enumerated factors generally fall into
one of the following categories: "(1) the child's wishes; (2) the child's
identity; (3) the effect of the name on child's relationships with
others...; (4) the effect on the child's property interests; (5) the effect
100.
The following states utilize a best interest standard: Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
TennesSee, Texas, Vermont, Utah, Washington, West Virginia. For cases and statutes on
point in each of the states, see Weiner, supra note 37, at 1710 n.65.
101.
Id. at 1709. See generally Leann Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of the
"Best Interests of the Child" Standard, 34 S.D. L. REV. 459 (1995); Harvey R. Sorkow, Best
Interests of the Child: By Whose Definition?, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 383 (1991).
102.
See Seng, supra note 1 at 1313.
103.
UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1987).
104.
For example, in Keegan v. Gudahl, the court articulated the following factors to
be considered when determining the appropriateness of a name change: "(1) misconduct by
one of the parents; (2) failure to support the child; (3) failure to maintain contact with the
child; (4) the length of time the surname has been used; ... (5) whether the surname is
different from that of the custodial parent, and whether the name change might contribute to
estrangement from the other parent. 525 N.W.2d 695,699 (S.D. 1994).
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of the name change on the parents; (6) parental misconduct; and (7)
motivations underlying the name change.""5
The states that use a best interests of the child standard approach the
matter in one of two ways: either a statute actually outlines the
appropriate factors to be used or the court has the responsibility of
discussing which factors will be examined on a case-by-case basis. 6 As
stated above, either method yields similar results.
The development of minor name change law in California provides
an instructive example of how the best interests standard works. In
particular, two California cases demonstrate the operation of the best
interests standard. In re Schiffinan" isone of the most frequently cited
cases in the case law of other states that have adopted a best interests
approach."6 In Schiffinan, the parties divorced approximately three
months before the birth of their child."' At the time of the divorce, the
mother reassumed her birth surname, and then gave that surname to the
child as well. 1 The court of appeals held that, due to custom and
tradition and in accordance with prior case law, the child's father had a
"protectible" and "primary" right to have the child bear his surname."
1
The California Supreme Court abolished this rule, citing California's
Civil Code: "When the reason for a rule ceases, so should the rule
itself. 112 The court described its adoption of a best interests test as "an
evolutionary change in the state's rules for resolving parental disputes
over children's surnames. 113 Specifically, the Schiffinan decision
outlined the following factors to be considered in a name change
proceeding: the length of time the child has used the existing surname;
the effect of a name change on preservation of the child's relationship
with both parents; and identification of the child as part of a family
105.
Kelly, supra note 23, at 59.
106.
Current name change approaches include "an unguided best interest test,
custodial parent deference, and a best interest test with factors." Id at 55.
107.
620 P.2d 579 (Cal. 1980).
108.
See, e.g., Pizzioni v. Yarbrough, 868 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993);
Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273,277 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d
856,861 (NJ. 1995).
109.
See Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 580.
110.
See id.
111.
Id The court of appeals cited several prior California cases in which courts had
ruled that a change of surname would be permitted only "where the father's misconduct has
been such as to justify a forfeiture of his rights or where his name is positively deleterious to
the child." Id.(quoting In re Worms, 252 Cal. App. 2d 130 (1967)).
112.
1d at 583 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3510).
113.
Id
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unit."' The court balanced "[t]he symbolic role that a surname other
than the natural father's may play in easing relations with a new
family... against the importance of maintaining the biological fatherchild relationship" and also considered any "embarrassment or
discomfort that a child may experience when he bears a surname
different from the rest of his family."'15 In Schiffman, the California
Supreme Court explicitly recognized the value of allowing the mother
and child to bear the same surname, in that case, the maternal birth
name. 116
A later California case, In re Marriageof McManamy, 7 confirmed

the court's use of the above factors to make name change
determinations. The father's mere unhappiness with the surname
"Templeton" (the custodial mother's surname from a former marriage)
was insufficient grounds to have the child's surname changed to
"McManamy-Templeton".1 8 The court held that if the child was given
the mother's surname at birth and has since used that name, even if it is
the mother's surname from a former marriage, the best interest scale
tips in favor of maintaining that surname at the parents' dissolution. 9
The court stated that this is particularly so where the same surname is
used by the child's siblings, children of the mother's former marriage,
with whom the child lives for the majority of the year.7 The court
2
noted that the child did bear her father's name as a middle name. '
More importantly, however, the court pointed out that the child's
"understanding of her father's role in her life will not be based solely on
her surname, but will develop in light of his conduct and attitudes,
particularly his active involvement in her life."'22
C. Evaluation

An examination based strictly upon the best interests of the child
offers the best solution for children and parents desiring a name change.
The custodial parent presumption may create slightly more consistency,
but presumptions in legal issues involving children "prevents the court
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id.
Schiffinan, 620 P.2d at 583.
Id. at 584.
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216 (Cal. App. 2d. 1993).
See id. at 218.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
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from fairly assessing evidence of the individual child's circumstance."' '
Further, the custodial parent presumption places too much power in the
hands of that parent: "non-custodial parents who cannot have daily
contact with their children nevertheless feel that their children are part
of their families" and "want to stay connected. 1 24 The court may still
consider the custodial parent's wishes as part of the best interests test,
but those wishes should not be granted pre-emptively.
Though the best interest test has been criticized for allowing too
much subjectivity'-' and leading to inconsistent results,' 6 the standard's
pervasiveness in other areas of family and juvenile law belies those
criticisms. Name change disputes, as other post-divorce disputes, are
intensely personal and circumstantial. Allowing a court to consider
legislatively or judicially determined factors and weigh them in a
manner appropriate to the particular case does give a fair amount of
discretion to the court. However, providing the court with an
opportunity to look into the individual situation of each dispute
promotes a more child-centered approach.
VI. LEGISLATIVE CHANGE IN WISCONSIN

The requirement in Wisconsin that both parents consent to a child's
name change leaves family courts impotent to deal with the issue should
a dispute arise. Through Jocius and In re Noah JM., the court of
appeals has effectively foreclosed the possibility of arguing that
provisions in the statutes allowing the court to consider any matter in
the best interest of the child should include name changes. Thus, trial
courts await an explicit grant of authority from the Wisconsin
legislature. The legislature should equip Wisconsin courts with the tools
to deal with the name change of a child under fourteen when such a
change would be in the best interests of the child.
Wisconsin's history on name changes begs the question of why
Wisconsin has not adopted a more modem, child-centered approach.
There is no definite answer to this question. As stated above, "the law
of naming and name changing is often the last area of family law to
reflect norms that have been repudiated in other areas.""lV Opposition
123.
124.
125.

Seng, supra note 14, at 1314.
Id. at 1349.
See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,655-56 (1979). See also Kennedy-Sjodin, supra

note 18, at 184-90.
126.
127.

See Foggar, supra note 14, at 595.
Kelly, supra note 23, at 75-76. This maxim certainly holds true in Wisconsin.
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to such legislation might argue against according the high level of
judicial discretion required in such matters; however, the best interests
of the child standard is used in several similar contexts in Wisconsin
law."
Another common concern is that allowing these types of name
changes would reduce administrative efficiency, but "any recordkeeping justification is suspect because of the existence of statutory
name change procedures."'' 29 Furthermore, "[t]he name given to a child
does not affect the accuracy or completeness of vital information
recorded on birth certificates. In this age of sophisticated computer
systems, the power to impose particular surnames on children is not
necessary
for the collection and processing of information about
births. ,,""0
Finally, the opposition to such legislation might fear that child name
changes will become simply another "bargaining chip" in the "game of
divorce."' Examining the motives of the moving parties as part of the
best interests standard would alleviate that possibility."
Wisconsin's current system results in an irrefutable deference to the
paternal surname, in that, usually at birth, the marital child is given the
father's name. Such deference is "inconsistent with the traditional
common-law right to change one's name, with the custodial parent's
broad discretion to control the child's life, and with the fundamental
concern for the child's best interests." 33
In addition, Wisconsin's law on this issue should be harmonized with
other family law guidelines in Wisconsin which require application of
the best interests of the child standard. For example, Wisconsin courts
must consider the best interests of the child when making custody
determinations,"' placement of children in need of protection and

128.
See infra text accompanying notes 129-131.
129.
Foggar, supra note 14, at 592 n.67. "Although in the seventeenth century
governmental convenience may have been a satisfactory reason for maintaining a maleoriented naming system, it is insufficient today." Seng, supranote 14, at 1327.
130.
Foggar, supra note 14, at 592. Another critic notes that "the identities of
American citizens are not administered through surnames, but through social security
numbers, which do not change." Curtis, supra note 13, at 190.
131.
Kennedy-Sjodin, supra note 18, at 184-90.
132.
Looking at parental motives "ought to provide the protection against the
exploitation of children in disputes between parents." Kelly, supra note 23, at n.261.
133.
Seng, supra note 14, at 1306.
134.
See WIs. STAT. § 767.25(lm)(hm) (1997), mandating that the court consider a
number of factors and any "matter in the best interest of the child."
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services,'35 and paternity matters.3 The current statute also places
unduly burdensome administrative restrictions on child name changes;
the notice and filing requirements are both expensive and timeconsuming.
However, the most important reason for implementing a new
standard in post-divorce name change disputes is so that children like
Matthew, Jennifer, and Bryan Jocius may enjoy a symbolic personal
identity which more accurately and fairly reflects their familial
relationships. As one court stated, "[i]t seems only logical that a child
will grow up feeling more a part of the family unit when she shares the
name of the parent with whom she resides, in this case, the mother.""
VII. CONCLUSION

The majority of states now apply some sort of best interest standard
to adjudicate child name change disputes. Wisconsin does not even
allow for the possibility. As a result, the Jocius children and others are
forced to remain associated with individuals who for all intents and
purposes, are "non-parent[s]." Since the court of appeals has made it
clear that it will not allow such name changes without an express grant
of authority from the legislature,'39 Wisconsin lawmakers should
incorporate a name change provision into post-divorce and paternity
provisions that would allow courts to grant name change requests
(despite the protest of one parent) when such a change would be in the
best interests of the child.
Wisconsin children deserve the opportunity to have their names,
their identifying symbols, reflect a changed personal and social reality.
CATHERINE A. R=ITERBUSCH
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